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U.S. National Security Implications of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
Christopher Shiraldi*
The use of the sea as a means of transport has not only provided
coastal states with tremendous opportunities but also has created
grave dangers to their security.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In this era of increasing technology, the world is becoming a much
smaller place. Coastal countries react to security threats by expanding
their jurisdiction and authority.2 Today, terrorists and other criminals
have the potential to possess the same economic and technological
resources as national governments do. Terrorists have access to an ever
expanding pool of resources, including maritime vessels and the sea
itself, with which to attack enemy countries.
Since the terrorist actions on September 11, 2001, increased security
has become a priority in the United States, especially now that terrorists
use all means of transportation to carry out their activities. As a country
with an expansive coast, the United States has enacted several security
programs in order to protect against terrorist threats, particularly from the
oceans.3 Container transportation along the sea poses a great security
risk for the United States because of the difficulty in accounting for the
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, May 2009. I thank my family and all my friends for their support and
patience. Special thanks to everyone who helped me and kept me sane during the
comment writing process.
1. Math Noortmann, The US Container Security Initiative: A Maritime Transport
Security Measure or an (inter)National Public Security Measure?, 10 lus GENTIUM 139,
142 (2004).
2. Id. at 143.
3. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/
proliferation (last visited Nov. 8, 2008); The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan,
Sept. 29, 2006, available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo-security/
csi/csi strategic-plan.ctt/csi-strategic-plan.pdf.
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massive amounts of shipments and containers held within those
shipments.4
Entering into force in 1994, the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea ("the Convention") 5 is the preeminent authority on the
use of the sea. Most developed, coastal nations have joined the
Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, the United States has not.
The United States has signed it, but the Senate has not ratified it. The
Convention sets jurisdictional, procedural, and operational laws that bind
its members, which is why the United States has been cautious with
regards to ratifying the Convention,
This Comment first examines current U.S. programs dealing with
the issue of maritime terrorism. Next, it analyzes and explains the
articles and provisions of the Convention. Finally, the consequences of
ratifying the Convention on U.S. national security, both positive and
negative, are explored.
II. U.S. SECURITY PROGRAMS
The U.S. government has taken major initiatives on the maritime
front in order to protect itself from terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. The first such governmental program is
the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), 6 initiated in September of
2003. 7 The second program enacted by the United States is the
Container Security Initiative ("CSI"). 8 The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency ("CBPA") implemented the CSI in January of 2002.9
Most recently, in September 2005, the United States adopted the third
strategy for protecting itself, National Strategy for Maritime Security
("NSMS"). 10
A. The Proliferation Security Initiative
The PSI was initially created by the United States and ten other
contributing countries.11 Thereafter, five additional countries agreed
4. See Noortmann, supra note 1.
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter the Convention].
6. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
7. See id.
8. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3.
9. See id.
10. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD 13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf.
l1. The original eleven countries included Australia, Britain, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United States. Barbara
Slavin, 11 Nations Join Plan to Stop N. Korea Ships, USA TODAY, July 23, 2003, at 6A.
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joined the PSI. 12 The initial meeting between the countries focused on
North Korea and efforts to prevent North Korea's shipment of weapons
of mass destruction ("WMDs"). 13 However, the PSI is not focused on
one particular state, but rather aims to stop the proliferation of WMDs on
a global scale.
14
The PSI is not based on a treaty, nor does it have enforceable
authority. 15 It is however, a set of agreements between the participating
nation-states. 16 All states participating in the PSI are devoted to stopping
the shipment of WMDs.17 National and global security concerns have
risen proportionately to the increase in transportation and trade of
WMDs. 18  WMDs can be transported between states themselves or
between terrorist groups, thereby increasing security concerns. 19 The PSI
attempts to use various methods besides force to stop the proliferation of
WMDs around the world.2°
The first goal of the PSI is to identify actors who are suspected of
transporting WMDs, including both alleged countries and independent
actors. 2 1 The next goal of the PSI is to increase communication among
participating countries by the effective sharing of relevant information.22
Sharing relevant information between these countries ensures that
suspected actors are monitored and tracked with precision. 2' Finally, the
PSI is also designed to encourage participants to review their own laws
24
and international laws in order to stop the proliferation of WMDs.
Review of existing laws seeks to validate, promote, and give more
credibility to the PSI.
25
12. The five subsequent countries to join the PSI included Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Singapore, and Turkey. ANDREAS PERSBO & IAN DAVIS, BRITISH AM. SEC. INFO.
COUNCIL, SAILING INTO UNCHARTED WATERS? THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (June 2004) available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/
Research/04PSI.htm.
13. See Slavin, supra note 11.
14. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., Statement of
Interdiction Principles Remarks at Proliferation Sec. Initiative Meeting (Sept. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm.
15. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
16. See id.
17. See Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction
Principles, Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
09/2003/09/04-11 .html [hereinafter PSI Fact Sheet].
18. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See PERSBO & DAVIS, supra note 12.
22. See Bolton, supra note 14.
23. See id.
24. See PERSBO & DAVIS, supra note 12.
25. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
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Although the PSI is not based on a particular treaty, it is harmonious
with current U.S. and United Nations ("U.N.") law.26 The PSI is rooted
in political agreements, interdiction principles, and interdiction training
exercises. 27 Training exercises are led by individual nation-states and are
based on one specific aspect of interdiction: land, air, or sea.28  The
interdiction principles "identify practical steps necessary to interdict
shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and
related materials flowing to and from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern at sea, in the air, or on land. 2 9 The marine aspect
of the interdiction principles established by the PSI aim to prevent
shipments of WMDs while they are still at sea en route to their
destination. 30 In an era of increasing technology, these shipments must
be intercepted at sea because it may be too late once the shipments
actually reach land.3'
1. PSI Interdiction Principles
The Interdiction Principles are the heart of the PSI. 32 By adhering
to these principles, all participating countries aspire to support each other
in reducing the global proliferation of WMDs.33
The PSI's Interdiction Principles are composed of four major
components. 34 The first principle asserts that nation-states must take any
effective measures to intercept and stop the transportation of WMDs.35
States must also prevent WMDs delivery systems and the transfer of
materials between states suspected of proliferation. 36  The second
principle is to "adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of
relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity [and]
protecting the confidential character of classified information provided
by other states ... The third principle requires that participating
nation-states work together to strengthen security, legal measures and
international legal frameworks in order to support the other objectives of
the PSI.
38
26. See PSI Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
27. See Bolton, supra note 14.
28. See id.
29. The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Bolton, supra note 14.
33. See PSI Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
34. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
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The fourth principle of the PSI interdiction principles is the most
extensive and important.3 9 States must prevent delivery of WMDs and
any materials relating to WMDs.4 ° Preventative and investigatory
actions must conform to both the State's own legal framework and
international law.41 The forth principal describes specific actions that
participating nation-states may and may not take.42 In support of the PSI
and its interdiction efforts, participating nation-states must perform
specific actions to prohibit shipments of WMDs.43 For example, a
country may not "transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes
to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so." 44  Further,
nation-states may search their own ships that are reasonably suspected of
transporting WMDs or provide consent to have their vessels searched by
other nation-states.
45
Furthermore, countries should "stop and/or search in their internal
waters, territorial sea, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or
non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that
are identified., 46 Nation-states must place restrictions on ships in their
jurisdiction that are reasonably suspected of transporting WMDs. 4 7
When a ship uses a state's ports, internal waters, or territorial sea, the
ship may be subject to boarding, followed by search and seizure of any
cargo found to be related to WMDs. 48 Moreover, nation-states must
inspect vessels if their ports "are used as transshipment points for
shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern, to inspect vessels ... reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
' 49
2. Bilateral Agreements
Bilateral agreements between countries are a key aspect of the
PSI. 50 Two U.S. agreements arising from the PSI are the interdiction and
39. The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
49. Id.
50. See PSI Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
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ship boarding agreements between the United States and Belize51 and the
United States and Panama, respectively. The United States also entered
into a ship boarding agreement with Liberia.53 Each of these agreements
focuses on searching and seizing vessels located in international waters
not subject to either country's jurisdiction.54 Using the agreement with
Belize as an example, the term "international waters" is defined as all
parts of the sea not included in the territorial sea, internal waters and
archipelagic waters 55 of a state, consistent with the respective
Constitutions of each Party and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.",56 According to the agreement with Belize, in other
zones of the sea, such as the contiguous zone and the high seas, the
vessel's own State has jurisdiction over the vessel, except when it is
fleeing the territorial sea of another state.57
Under each of the agreements, ships that are reasonably suspected
of transporting WMDs will be subject to seizure.58 Because vessels in
international waters are only subject to the jurisdiction of the state whose
flag they fly,59 a state wishing to board another state's ship must first
seek the consent of that state.6° Consent of the vessel's state must come
in a timely manner61 or the requesting state may proceed without
62consent. 2 The agreements also review the conduct of officials boarding
the suspected ships and provide safeguards to the ships, crew, and cargo
on board.63 Article 14 of the boarding agreement with Belize discusses
the settlement of disputes between the countries. 64 It provides that the
countries must either come to mutual agreements or request a
consultation from the other party to resolve any disputes that arise from
51. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Belize Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea, U.S.-Belize,
Aug. 4, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/50809.htm [hereinafter Belize
Agreement].
52. Judith Miller, Panama Joins Accord to Stem Ships' Transport of Illicit Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at Al1.
53. See PERSBO & DAVIS, supra note 12.
54. See Miller, supra note 52.
55. Archipelagic waters are the waters surrounding a cluster of islands, no matter
their distance from the coast of an island as defined in Article 49 of the Convention. See
The Convention, supra note 5, art. 49.
56. Belize Agreement, supra note 51.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 94, 2b.
60. See Miller, supra note 52.
61. The term "timely manner" is not defined in the Belize Agreement.
62. See Belize Agreement, supra note 51.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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the implementation of the agreement regarding the boarding of ships or
otherwise.65
Previous altercations show how countries proceed with stopping,
boarding, and searching of suspected vessels. 66 In 2002, Spanish ships
seized and boarded a North Korean vessel suspected of transporting
illegal materials.67 Spanish officials deemed the vessel suspect because it
flew no flag and avoided inspection.68 During the search, Spanish
authorities found missiles hidden onboard the ship.69 However, there
was nothing illegal about the missiles and the North Korean ship was
allowed to proceed on its way. 70 A separate incident occurred in 2003,
when the United States stopped a suspected vessel in the Persian Gulf.'
In an example of a successful PSI interdiction, the U.S. Navy boarded
and searched the ship and found illegal drugs and multiple terrorist
suspects.72
B. The Container Security Initiative
The next program designed to protect the United States against
threats from the sea is the CSI.73 The CSI is run by the CBPA.74 The
goal of the CBPA is to protect the United States from terrorism by
securing its borders and ports.75 Working with other countries, the CSI
places U.S. officials in ports around the world in order to inspect
suspicious containers. 76 Additionally, the United States allows foreign
customs officials to be stationed at American ports for inspection of
outgoing ships.77 Because of the inherent difficulty of stopping ships on
the high seas, the CSI aims to stop weapons or other illegal cargo at their
65. See id.
66. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Boarding of North Korean Vessel on the High Seas, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh94.htm.
67. See Ian Patrick Barry, Note, The Right of Visit, Search, and Seizure of Foreign
Flagged Vessels on the High Seas Pursuant to Customary International Law: A Defense
of the Proliferation Security Initiative, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 299, 299 (2004).
68. See Kirgis, supra note 66 (stating "according to a Pentagon official, the vessel
took evasive measures in order to avoid inspection").
69. See Steven R. Weisman, US. to Send Signal to North Koreans in Naval
Exercise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at Al.
70. See id.
71. See Barry, supra note 67.
72. See id at 300.
73. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at i.
74. CSI in Brief, October 3, 2007, http:/www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/
cargo-security/csi/csi-in-brief.xml (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
75. See Fact Sheet: Securing U.S. Ports, July 12, 2006, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/port-security/securing-us-ports.xml
[hereinafter Securing U.S. Ports].
76. See CSI in Brief, supra note 74.
77. See id.
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point of origin.78 Therefore, the CSI requires that U.S. officials inspect
suspected vessels and high risk containers before the cargo is shipped out
of foreign ports.79
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has increased port
security in response to the use of mass transportation as a conduit for
terrorist activities.80 "Since an estimated 95 percent of U.S. imports
move by sea, the security environment must place a premium on
detecting, identifying, and tracking terrorist networks with interests in
disrupting maritime commerce."8' The CSI helps identify and prescreen
high risk containers prior to shipment.82 The CSI employs new
technology to screen the high risk containers and to develop new, secure
containers.83
Initiated by the CBPA in 2002, the CSI is an international program
that protects the world's primary method of global trade.84 Through the
CSI program, U.S. CBPA officials work primarily with customs officials
in other countries.8 5 The two coordinating countries share intelligence in
order to target and stop shipments of illegal material before they leave a
particular port. 86  Targeting every suspected shipment would be
impossible; therefore, officials use advanced technology to screen
87cargo. Nevertheless, the CSI is expansive in scope, securing ports in
various parts of the world 88 such as North, Central and South America,
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.8 9 Each of these ports has an
established CSI program aimed at eliminating the shipment of WMDs,
especially to the United States.90
1. CSI Goals
The CSI sets out to accomplish three goals. The first strategic goal
of the CSI is to secure the U.S. borders through evaluation of all
containers bound for the United States with potential for a terroristic
threat.91 The United States uses three objectives to meet this first goal of
78. See id.
79. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at i.
80. See Securing U.S. Ports, supra note 75.
81. The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at i.
82. See id.
83. Seeid. at 11.
84. See id. at i.
85. See CSI in Brief, supra note 74.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at 6.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 15.
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evaluation. The first objective focuses on identifying high risk cargo
shipments using advanced information and trade data.92 The CSI tries to
hasten the shipment of low risk cargo throughout the world by using
advanced technology and information transfer.93 Once the cargo has
been identified, the next objective is to screen and examine those
containers using X-ray or gamma ray technology. 94 The last objective
promotes inspections equally throughout all CSI ports before shipments
enter the United States.95
The second goal of the CSI is to develop and maintain a strong
cargo security system. This goal strives to create a "system that will
withstand a terrorist incident and ensure a continuous flow of trade, or
promptly resume trade through CSI ports, should a terrorist event
occur."
9 6 The first objective of this goal is to advance international
security by promoting techniques the United States uses to standardize
security operations at CSI ports.97 If the proper ports are selected to
participate in the CSI, it will strengthen security and trade. 98 Trade
volume, terrorism connections, and geographical interests all impact the
selection of ports for the CSI. 99 The other objective of this goal states
that the CBPA must work with other governmental agencies to develop
management and contingency plans.'00
The final goal of the CSI is to protect and facilitate trade on a global
scale. 101  The CSI seeks to accomplish this "by maintaining [and]
effectively operating CSI ports, working with host nations to inspect all
containers identified as posing a potential terrorist risk and providing
benefits and incentives to international governments and organizations as
well as to our trading partners."'' 0 2 The CBPA negotiates with other CSI
participating countries to use an Automated Targeting System to
examine all high-risk shipments in the foreign nation's ports. 10 3 Foreign
ports are assessed in order to determine if they are meeting CSI
requirements. 0 4 The assessment includes an evaluation of the terrorist
threats to the particular port and the costs and benefits of including that
92. See id.
93. See id. at 16.
94. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at 23.
95. See id. at 17.
96. Id. at 19.
97. See id. at 20.
98. See id. at 21-22.
99. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at 22.
100. See id.
101. Seeid. at 24.
102. Id. at 25.
103. See id.
104. See The Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3, at 26.
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port in the CSI. 10 5  The U.S. CBPA acquires interagency and
international cooperation in order to promote the enhancement of global
maritime security. 0 6 Throughout this process, the U.S. CBPA constantly
evaluates and monitors its CSI teams in foreign countries with the
ultimate goal of improving operations. 1
0 7
2. Membership in the CSI
In order to be considered for membership in the CSI, each potential
port must meet minimum standards set by the U.S. CBPA. ° 8 Each port
must have regular and substantial shipments to the United States. 10 9 The
foreign state must allow U.S. customs officials to inspect containers
flowing through the particular port.110 In addition, the port must allow
the use of X-ray or gamma ray technology to examine containers being
shipped.1 11  Due to these requirements, developing countries find it
difficult to participate in the program.' More developed countries are
given priority treatment in this program because of their ability to
comply with the mandatory standards. 13  Therefore, developing
countries are at a disadvantage due to the negative impact on their ability
to trade with the United States. 1 4 Nevertheless, developing countries
often pose the greatest terror threat to the United States and other
countries.
1 15
C. The National Strategy for Maritime Security
The NSMS seeks to prevent terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.1 16 "In December 2004, the President [of
the United States] directed the Secretaries of the Department of Defense
and Homeland Security to lead the Federal effort to develop a
comprehensive NSMS."'1 17  The plan integrates all federal maritime
105. See id.
106. See id. at 27-29.
107. See id. at 30.
108. CSI: Container Security Initiative, Minimum Standards for CSI Expansion,
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo-security/csi/minimum-standards.ctt/mi
nimum_standards.doc (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Marjorie Florestal, Terror on the High Seas: The Trade and Development
Implications of U.S. National Security Measures, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 385, 394 (2007).
113. See id. at 395.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 394-95.
116. See The National Strategy for Maritime Security, supra note 10, at ii.
117. Id.
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security programs in an effort to effectively address threats to maritime
security." 18 In accordance with the NSMS plan, the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security have created eight supporting plans to
address different aspects of maritime security.
119
The NSMS acknowledges that the best method for protecting the
United States is not through unilateral action.1 20 The strategy combines
public and private, as well as national and international action in order to
combat maritime terrorism. 12  The first step the United States took in
accordance with this strategy was to enhance international
cooperation. 122 The United States seeks to accomplish a cooperative plan
by adopting international frameworks, developing measures and
techniques for information exchange and identification of terrorists and
suspected vessels, and adopting procedures for inspecting vessels and
enforcement. 123
Next, the United States attempts to maximize its awareness in the
maritime domain.1 24  The United States is expanding technology,
intelligence, and international agreements in an effort to achieve a better
understanding of the sea. 125 The NSMS uses a layered security approach
to defend against threats on the maritime front. 126  "Specifically, a
layered approach to maritime security means applying some measure of
security to each of the following points of vulnerability: transportation,
staff, passengers, conveyances, access control, cargo and baggage, ports,
and security en route."'' 27 Also included in the layered security approach
is physical cargo inspection, interdiction of personnel and materials, and
military and law enforcement response. 128 The final aspect the United
States must assess is ensuring conformity in the global maritime system
in order to preserve global trade and national defense.
129
118. See id.
119. See id. (including programs such as the National Plan to Achieve Domain
Awareness, the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan, the Interim Maritime
Operational Threat Response Plan, the International Outreach and Coordination Strategy,
the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, the Maritime Transportation System Security
Plan, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan, and the Domestic Outreach Plan).
120. See id. at 13.
121. See The National Strategy for Maritime Security, supra note 10, at 13.
122. See id. at 14.
123. See id. at 14-15.
124. See id. at 16.
125. See id. at 17.
126. See The National Strategy for Maritime Security, supra note 10, at 20.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 21-22.
129. See id.
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III. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
A. Background
In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly organized the Third
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. 30 The Conference sought to
establish an international framework for laws governing the sea.'
3
'
Originally drafted in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea ("the Convention") was put into force in 1994.132 As of 2007,
155 states, not including the United States, have agreed to the
Convention.13 3 The Convention deals with three primary issues. First, it
defines different maritime zones and their boundaries. 34  Second, the
Convention also establishes various measures for increasing security,
protecting the environment, and conserving natural resources.
1 35
Additionally, the Convention sets up three authoritative bodies to deal
with different maritime issues. 
136
The United States was involved in the initial discussions and
drafting of the Convention, however, the U.S. did not sign the final
draft. 137  The United States did not sign the Convention because it
objected to the deep seabed provisions contained therein. 138  However,
the 1994 agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the
Convention 139 sought to address concerns regarding the deep seabed.1
40
Because of the deep seabed amendment, the agreement was signed and
Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged the Senate to give its advice
and consent to ratify the Convention.' 4' As of May 2007, the United
130. See David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber, The United States and the 1982 Law
of the Sea Treaty, 11 ASIL INSIGHTS 16 (2007), available at http://asil.org/insights/
2007/06/insights070611 .html#_ednI.
131. See id.
132. See The Convention supra note 5.
133. See MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.N. LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION AND THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OCTOBER 2003 (2007),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21890.pdf.
134. See The Convention supra note 5.
135. See id.
136. See id. (stating that the authorities are the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and the International
Seabed Authority).
137. See Caron & Scheiber, supra note 130 (explaining that in 1982, the Reagan
office refused to sign the treaty although the three prior Presidents all were involved in
negotiations).
138. See id.
139. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Agreement Relating to
the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 Dec. 1982, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994).
140. See The Convention, supra note 5; see also Caron & Scheiber, supra note 130.
141. See S. ExEC. REP. No. 108-10, at 6(2004).
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States has still not ratified the Convention because the Senate has not
given the advice and consent needed to effectuate the agreement. 142
B. The Convention's Maritime Zones
The Convention divides the ocean into six different zones with
different characteristics and rights. 4 3 Part II of the Convention discusses
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 144 The control of a nation-state
extends past its land and internal waters and includes the water, air space,
bed, and subsoil. 45 The Convention limits the extent of the Territorial
Sea to twelve nautical miles from the state's baseline.' 46  Within the
Territorial Sea, all ships that fly the flag of a state have the right of
innocent passage. 47  Article 24 of the Convention declares that in the
Territorial Sea, a State must not impede the innocent passage of foreign
ships. 48  However, Article 25 asserts that a "State may take the
necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not
innocent., 149  The state also has the right to temporarily suspend the
innocent passage rights if doing so is compulsory for security reasons.
150
Except in certain circumstances, a state may not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over a person or ship within its Territorial Sea.' 5' In the case
of a warship, 52 a state may demand the warship leave the state's
jurisdiction if it does not comply with the State's laws and regulations. 53
However, the Convention does not interfere with a warship's immunity
in the Territorial Sea.'
54
142. See source cited infra note 251.
143. Zones include the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone,
the Continental Shelf, and the High Seas. Although not specifically enumerated in the
Convention, the Internal Waters of a State are defined in Article 8 which states, "waters
on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters
of the State." The Convention, supra note 5.
144. See id. arts. 2, 33.
145. See id. art. 2, 1-2.
146. Defined in Article 5, the normal baseline is the "low-water line along the coast
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the State." See id. art. 5.
147. See id. art. 17. (stating that "passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to
the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State.")
148. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 24.
149. Id. art. 25.
150. "Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published." See
id.
151. Seeid. art. 27.
152. See id. art. 29 (defining warship as a "ship belonging to the armed forces of a
State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality").
153. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 30.
154. See id. art. 32.
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A coastal state may exercise sovereignty over the Contiguous Zone
in order to accomplish limited goals.155 A state may exercise control in
this zone in order to prevent and punish violations of its customs, laws,
or regulations that occur in the State's Territorial Sea. 156 The limit of the
Contiguous Zone is twenty-four nautical miles from the same baseline as
the Territorial Sea is measured. 1
57
In addition, the Convention also defines the Exclusive Economic
Zone ("EEZ"). 158 A state has exclusive control of the natural resources
contained within the EEZ.'5 9 The EEZ extends up to two hundred
nautical miles from the baseline of a state. 160 The EEZ gives a coastal
state "sovereign rights" to the natural resources and economic utilization
of that zone, and also confers jurisdiction upon the state. 161 While a
coastal state maintains certain rights within the EEZ, all other states hold
a freedom of navigation within the zone.162  Nevertheless, the other
States must comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state that
are in accordance with international law.'163 Article 59 of the Convention
outlines procedures for conflict resolution, but does not state how
conflicts that arise in the EEZ should be resolved. 164 Article 73 of the
Convention sets the standard for enforcement of laws in the EEZ. 165 A
coastal state has the power to stop, inspect, and arrest in order to protect
its natural resources in the EEZ.166 However, "arrested vessels and their
crews [should] be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond
or other security."
167
Moreover, a state's Continental Shelf extends two hundred miles
from its baseline and contains the seabed and subsoil in the area. 68 The
rights of a coastal state over its Continental Shelf only extend to its
155. See id. art. 33, 1.
156. See id. art. 33, 1 la-b.
157. See id. art. 33, 12.
158. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 55.
159. See id. art. 60.
160. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 57.
161. See id. art. 56, la-b (explaining that jurisdiction in the EEZ includes the
formation of artificial structures, scientific research, and preservation of the
environment).
162. See id. art. 58, 1.
163. See id. art. 58, 3.
164. See id. art. 59.
165. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 73.
166. See id. art. 73 (stating that a state may take these steps in order to "ensure
compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this
Convention.")
167. Id.
168. See id. art. 76.
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natural resources, and these rights must not interfere with the freedom of
navigation or rights of other states in the same area.
1 69
The High Seas lie outside the jurisdiction of any state, coastal or
otherwise.17 No state can exercise jurisdiction171 over the area and every
state has the right to sail ships on the High Seas. 172  Each state has
complete autonomy on the High Seas. 173 In particular, warships 174 and
ships owned by a state 175 have complete immunity on the High Seas.
176
Contained within the High Seas section of the Convention is a
definition of piracy. 77  Even though no state has jurisdiction or
sovereignty on the High Seas, any State may capture and arrest a pirate
ship in the area. 178 A warship is not allowed to seize and board another
ship on the High Seas unless it has reasonable grounds
79 for doing so.' 80
In chasing a fleeing ship, hot pursuit may only be employed when there
is good cause to believe the ship has violated the laws of a state. 8' In
addition, hot pursuit must begin when the fleeing ship is in the Internal
Waters, Territorial Sea, or Contiguous Zone of the coastal State.'82 The
pursuit must stop when the fleeing ship enters the Territorial Sea of any
other State. 83 These pursuits can only be carried out by warships or
military aircraft 84 that have already given to the fleeing ship verbal and
visual warnings to stop. 85  Using these techniques and procedures,
suspicious ships can be stopped and the transportation of WMDs can be
prevented.
169. See id. art. 78, 1-2.
170. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 86.
171. See id. art. 89.
172. See id. art. 90.
173. See id. art. 87, 1. (outlining the freedoms as navigation, overflight, laying
submarine cables, constructing installations, fishing, and conducting scientific research).
174. See id. art. 95.
175. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 96.
176. See id. arts. 95, 96.
177. See id. art. 101 (defining piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or
any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship,
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State").
178. See id. art. 105 (stating in that this seizure and arrest may only be carried out by
a warship or military aircraft).
179. See id. art. 110, 1 (explaining that a warship must have reasonable grounds that
the suspected ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or is
without nationality).
180. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 110, 1.
181. See id. art. 11, 1.
182. See id.
183. Seeid. art. 111, 3.
184. Seeid. art. 111,95.
185. The Convention, supra note 5, art. 111, 4.
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C. Transfer of Technology
Articles 266 through 278 of the Convention regulate the
development and transfer of marine technology between the member
states of the Convention. States are required to work together with
international organizations in order to develop and share marine
technology. 186 However, the states must respect the rights of the other
parties who are involved in the transfer of this technology.
187
D. Settlement of Disputes
Any conflicts that arise between parties to the Convention must be
resolved peacefully' 88 in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. 189 If the states cannot reach a settlement, a party may request
that the dispute be resolved by a court or tribunal. 190 After signing the
Convention, a state must select one or more methods of dispute
resolution.' 91 The dispute resolution methods include the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea' 92 ("the Tribunal"), the International
Court of Justice, 193 or binding arbitration. 194 If the parties to the dispute
have not chosen the same tribunal or court, then arbitration must be used,
unless the parties agree otherwise. 95  The arbitration process in the
Convention is final and not appealable, unless agreed to in advance.
196
The parties to the dispute also have the option of agreeing to the
conciliation procedures expounded in the Convention.' 97  The
Convention gives the Tribunal and the International Court of Justice
jurisdiction to resolve any disagreement that arises from it.198 When a
state has not complied with Article 73 requirements to promptly release a
ship, Article 292 states that the issue must be submitted to the Tribunal,
or, if the parties agree within ten days, any other entity the parties
186. See id. art. 266, 1.
187. See id. art. 267.
188. See id. art. 279.
189. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3; see also id. art. 33, para. 1 (stating that the Charter of
the United Nations mandates that all international disputes must be settled peacefully
through normal channels of resolution in order to maintain international peace and
security).
190. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 286.
191. See id. art. 287, 1.
192. See id. art. 287, Ia.
193. See id. art. 287, lb.
194. See id. art. 387, lc-d.
195. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 287, 1 5.
196. See id. annex VII, 11.
197. See id. art. 284.
198. See id. art. 288.
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choose. 199 Once the Tribunal or selected body makes a decision, the
parties must strictly adhere to the decision.200 Nevertheless, a state, when
signing the Convention, may choose not to accept the methods of dispute
resolution that are provided.20 ' If a state does not elect a method of
dispute resolution, it forfeits its right to make any claims against another
State and to submit disputes under the same category.0 2
1. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The Tribunal is an "an independent judicial body established by the
Convention to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and
application of the Convention. 20 3  Headquartered in Hamburg,
Germany, 20 4 the Tribunal is accessible to all parties to the Convention.
20 5
In addition, certain other parties, such as international organizations and
independent legal persons, have access to the Tribunal.20 6 The Tribunal
has jurisdiction to hear all disagreements that arise under the provisions
207
of the Convention. Exclusive jurisdiction exists in cases involving the
prompt release of ships.20 8 The Tribunal is composed of twenty-one
members20 9 who must be from different countries.210 The Tribunal has
established a number of different chambers within itself to deal with
specialized disputes. 21 In order to reach a decision, a simple majority of
the Tribunal must occur.212 All decisions by the Tribunal are final and
must be followed by the parties who are in conflict with one another.
21 3
The Tribunal has the power to provide advisory opinions in certain
situations under the Convention in order to prevent future disputes.2' 4
199. See id. art. 292.
200. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 296.
201. See id. art. 298 (stating that a state may not accept the provisions regarding
disputes of sea boundary limitations, conciliation, or military activities).
202. See id. art. 298, 3.
203. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/
start2_en.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Tribunal].
204. See The Convention, supra note 5, annex VI, art. 1, 2.
205. See id. annex VI, art. 20, 1.
206. See Tribunal, supra note 203.
207. See The Convention, supra note 5, annex VI, art. 21.
208. See Tribunal, supra note 203.
209. See The Convention, supra note 5, annex VI, art. 2, 1.
210. See id. annex VI, art. 3, 1.
211. See Tribunal, supra note 203 (outlining the chambers to include the Chamber of
Summary Procedure, the Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, the Chamber for Marine
Environment Disputes and the Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes).
212. See The Convention, supra note 5, annex VI, art. 29.
213. See id. annex VI, art. 33, 1.
214. See Tribunal, supra note 203.
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Either a special agreement or a written application must be submitted in
order for the Tribunal to hear a case.215
a. The Hoshinmaru and Tomimaru Cases
The two most recent examples of how the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea settles disputes between member countries of the
Convention are set forth in the Hoshinmaru216 and Tomimaru Cases.
217
Both of these cases involved disputes between the Russian Federation
and Japan.218 Each case arose pursuant to Article 292 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.219 Each involved alleged
violations of Article 73(2) of the Convention.2
Article 73 of the Convention discusses the enforcement of laws and
regulations of the coastal state. 22' The coastal state may take measures to
ensure conformity to the laws of the Convention, including searching and
seizing vessels. 222 The vessels however, must be located within the EEZ
of the coastal state.223
Article 292 of the Convention provides for the prompt release of
vessels and crews once detained.224 When a state has detained a foreign
vessel, but has not promptly released that vessel, the vessel's state may
apply to any court or tribunal agreed upon to determine the question of
detention and release.225 Ten days after detention, if a reasonable bond
has not been set, the states may go to the Tribunal, unless the two states
226
agree otherwise.
The Hoshinmaru Case involved a Japanese fishing vessel under the
same name. 227 A Russian patrol boat stopped the Hoshinmaru when it
was fishing in the EEZ of the Russian Federation.228 Russian authorities
boarded the ship, searched it, and found concealed fish for which the ship
215. See id.
216. The 88 Hoshinmaru (Japan v. Russ.), Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Aug.
6, 2007), available at http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2007/document en-295.pdf.
217. The 53 Tomimaru (Japan v. Russ.), Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Aug. 6,
2007), available at http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2007/document en-296.pdf
218. See The 88 Hoshinmaru; see also The 53 Tomimaru.
219. See The Convention, supra note 5.
220. See The 88 Hoshinmaru; see also The 53 Tomimaru.
221. See The Convention, supra note 5.
222. See id. art. 73, 1.
223. See id. annex VI.
224. See id.
225. See id. art. 292, 1.
226. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 292, 1.
227. See The 88 Hoshinmaru (Japan v. Russ.), Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2007/
document en 295.pdf.
228. Id.
[Vol. 27:2
U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
did not account.229 The ship was detained and the cargo was taken into
custody.230 Twelve days after the detention the Russian Federation set a
bond of twenty-five million Russian Roubles for the release of the
Hoshinmaru. 1
Japan thought the amount of the bond was unreasonable under
Article 73(2) of the Convention, and thus brought an action to the
Tribunal under Article 292 of the Convention.232 The Tribunal found
that it had jurisdiction under Article 292 of the Convention because both
states were parties to the Convention.233 Japan alleged that the Russian
Federation had not complied with Article 73(2) of the Convention, and
the parties did not reach an agreement on the release of the vessel within
ten days of its detention as required under the Convention.234 The
Tribunal found that the amount of the bond was unreasonable and that
the Russian Federation had not complied with Article 73(2) of the
Convention.235 The Tribunal ordered the Russian Federation to promptly
release the Hoshinmaru upon the payment often million roubles.2 36
The facts of the Tomimaru Case are essentially the same. A
Japanese fishing vessel was located in the EEZ of the Russian Federation
when it was boarded and inspected by Russian authorities.237 The search
of the ship revealed that there was an unaccounted for amount of a
certain type of fish on board.238 During the ship's detention, the Japanese
government took multiple actions in order to secure the prompt release of
the vessel. 239  The owner of the ship filed in Russian court for its
release. 240 He then appealed to the District Court and the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, who dismissed the complaint. 241 Afterwards,
the vessel "'seized by the State as a beneficiary' was entered in the
Federal Property Register as property of the Russian Federation. 242
Japan once again filed with the Tribunal under Article 292 and
Article 73 of the Convention.243 The Tribunal determined that "the
confiscation of a vessel does not result per se in an automatic change of
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See The 88 Hoshinmaru.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See The 53 Tomimaru.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. The 53 Tomimaru.
243. See id.
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the flag or in its loss. Confiscation changes the ownership of a vessel but
ownership of a vessel and the nationality of a vessel are different [legal]
issues. '' 244 Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to
determine the application before it. 245 Article 292, paragraph 3, states
that the Tribunal must deal "without prejudice [with] the merits of any
case before the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner
or its crew.' ' 2 46 The decision by the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation ended the proceedings brought before its domestic courts.
2 4 7
Therefore, a decision by the Tribunal to "release the vessel would
contradict the decision which concluded the proceedings before the
appropriate domestic fora and encroach upon national competences, thus
contravening article 292, paragraph 3 of the Convention. 248
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SIGNING THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
A. Overview
In the time since September 11, 2001, national security has taken
the forefront in the U.S. governmental operations. 249 As concerns over
national security have increased over the years, so has the importance of
everything having an impact on national security. Since the Convention
has potential to substantially affect national security, U.S. succession to
it is highly controversial. Proponents and opponents of the Convention
differ greatly in determining if the Convention will aid or hurt the
national security of the United States. Opponents of the Convention
have, thus far, been successful in preventing it from being ratified by the
U.S. Senate.
Until recently, accession to the Convention has not been a priority
for the Senate. For over twenty years since the original Convention, the
United States has adhered to the principals of the Convention despite
never ratifying it.250 However, the Bush Administration has advocated
accession to the Convention. 25 1 In a press release on May 15, 2007,
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See The Convention, supra note 5.
247. See The 53 Tomimaru.
248. See id.
249. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3; see also The Container
Security Initiative Strategic Plan, supra note 3.
250. See Caron & Scheiber, supra note 130.
251. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's Statement on
Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans (May 15, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html.
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President Bush urged the Senate to ratify the Convention, stating that
ratification will promote the U.S. interests in the world's oceans and
national security.
252
The fact that the United States has operated for over twenty years
without ratifying the Convention has led opponents to argue ratification
is unnecessary.253 Opponents argue that signing the Convention would
diminish U.S. sovereignty and weaken national security.254 The problem
of sovereignty, for example, arises in giving power to the International
Seabed Authority ("ISA") established by the Convention. The ISA
controls mining rights and resources in the areas outside of the EEZ.255
Membership of the ISA is composed of numerous developing
countries. 256 Therefore, this leads proponents of the Convention to
suggest the United States will be underrepresented in the decision-
making process of the ISA if they do not ratify it.
257
B. Dispute Settlement Concerns
Another problem that may result from signing the Convention is
that any dispute that arises at sea, whether civil or military, will fall
under the jurisdiction of international tribunals and judges.258 If, under
the PSI, the U.S. Navy seizes a ship or vessel that it suspects of
transporting WMDs, the legality of the seizure may be decided by an
international body.259 According to the procedures of the Convention,
nation-states must choose a form of dispute resolution after joining.260
As stated earlier, the forms of dispute resolution include the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, or
arbitration.261
The Tribunal is composed of members who do not always support
the United States as well as others who are not allied with the United
States.262 In addition, there is no guarantee that members of the Tribunal
from countries allied with the United States will see the situation as the
252. See id.
253. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Jeremy Rabkin, Op-Ed. A Treaty the Senate Should
Sink, WASH. POST, July 2, 2007, at A19.
254. See Maggie Goodlander, Is the United States Ready to Approve the Law of the
Sea Treaty? COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., July 19, 2007, available at http://www.cfr.org/
publication/ 13851.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See Goldsmith & Rabkin, supra note 253.
259. See id.
260. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 287, 1.
261. See id.
262. See Goldsmith & Rabkin, supra note 253.
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United States does, which is typically the case. The members of the
Tribunal must enforce the provisions of the Convention and are not
concerned with what is in the best national security interest of the United
States. Unilateral action by the U.S. Navy, which may be necessary in
times of crisis or to prevent terrorism, will be greatly disadvantaged.
Through ratification, the United States would be able to nominate judges
who might thereafter be appointed to the Tribunal. These judges would
then be in a better position to understand the needs of U.S. security
interests.263
According to the Convention, if both states involved in a dispute do
not choose the same tribunal for handling disputes or do not choose a
tribunal at all, arbitration must be used to settle the disagreement.26 This
option includes a five-judge international arbitration board.265  The
countries involved in the dispute have the ability to help choose the
arbiters.266  Frequently however, the countries cannot agree on the
arbiters and the U.N. must step in and appoint the remaining judges to
decide the dispute.267
The judges must be chosen from a list predetermined by the
Convention which includes judges from each country of the
Convention.268 The list includes countries that do not have views similar
as the United States and whose interests may be adverse to U.S. security
concerns. Once again, international judges would determine the legality
of U.S. Naval operations. Giving this power to the U.N. and the
international community weakens the U.S. sovereignty and national
security. Even though a certain naval operation may seem necessary to
protect the United States and prevent terrorism, it will come under the
scrutiny of, and must be approved by, the designated international
forums under the Convention. "In every case, a majority of non-
American judges would decide whether the [U.S.] Navy can seize a ship
that it believes is carrying terrorist operatives or supplies for
terrorists.
'269
A related concern for the United States is that the Convention
exempts military activities from the jurisdiction of international
tribunals. 27° However, the term "military activity" is ambiguous and is
263. See Candace L. Bates, U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea: Passive Acceptance Is Not Enough to Protect U.S. Property Interests, 31 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 745, 746 (2006).
264. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 188.
265. See id. annex VII, art. 3.
266. See Goldsmith & Rabkin, supra note 253.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See id.
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not defined in the Convention. It could potentially be interpreted
broadly, meaning that any activity by a military body would be excluded
from the jurisdiction of the tribunals. On the other hand, it could be
narrowly interpreted meaning that only officially sanctioned and declared
military activities fall under the exemption.
According to proponents of the Convention, the United States
should impose, as a condition to ratification, that the United States alone
would determine what the phrase "military activities" means.27
Proponents hope that the United States can define the phrase and decide
what does and does not fall under the jurisdiction of the international
tribunals for dispute resolution. 7 2 However, opponents argue that the
tribunals for dispute resolution would still have authority over the
supposed military operation to determine the legality of the imposed
condition and capacity of the U.S. Navy.273
C. U.S. Security Program Concerns
There is debate as to whether signing the Law of the Sea
Convention will reinforce or diminish the U.S. security programs such as
the PSI and the CSI because the Convention may preclude these
274programs. By signing the Convention, it would take precedence over
these programs and the United States would have to adhere to the
provisions in the Convention. The PSI and CSI are major security
programs in the United States and the Convention may limit their
effectiveness. There are numerous examples of how the PSI and the CSI
have worked and increased national security. By limiting these
programs, the Convention may reduce the effectiveness of the United
States to protect its citizens from terrorism.
On the other hand, signing the Convention may actually strengthen
nonproliferation operations like the PSI and CSI. 275 As stated previously,
the PSI is not based in treaty or binding authority.276 If the United States
ratifies the Convention, it may constitute a step toward giving the PSI
binding, legal authority. By ratifying the Convention, the United States
may encourage more countries to join and further legitimize the PSI.
271. See Press Release, Senator Richard G. Lugar, An Overdue Step to Greater
Security (May 15, 2007), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=
274361 &&year=2007& [hereinafter Lugar].
272. See id.
273. See Goldsmith & Rabkin, supra note 253.
274. See Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Op-Ed., Don't Get LOST: The White House Toys With
Signing a Very Kerry Treaty, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 18, 2004,
http://www.nationalreview.com/gaffney/gaffhey200403181156.asp.
275. See Goodlander, supra note 254.
276. See The Proliferation Security Initiative, supra note 3.
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The Convention appears to be consistent with the principles and goals of
the PSI, and would reinforce them. Signing the Convention would
certainly seem to boost national security and give the United States wider
freedom in its military operations by supporting programs such as the
PSI and CSI.
D. Navigating the World's Oceans
Agreeing to the Convention will mean that the United States will be
subject to the same laws and regulations as all other nations who are part
of the Convention. However, it will also provide the United States with
the same advantages and freedoms as these member nations. The
Convention would improve access and transportation for U.S. ships. 77
This would "facilitate timely movement of [U.S.] forces throughout the
world., 278 This can work to improve national security. The Convention
would give U.S. ships freedom of passage to travel through international
straits and other bodies of water that were previously off limits.27 9
Senator Lugar, one of the chief proponents of acceding to the
Convention, argues that there are guarantees that U.S. ships, whether
military or civil, could travel freely throughout the world's sea lanes.28 °
Currently, as a non-party to the Convention, the United States must
obtain permission from a country in order to travel in that country's
Territorial Sea.28' If the United States does not receive this permission,
its ships must limit navigation to the Contiguous Zone of the other
country.282 This places obvious burdens on United States' ships, whether
military or otherwise. By ratifying the Convention, the United States can
ensure free passage in the zones they previously needed permission to
enter. The provisions in the Convention would preserve and expand the
rights of the United States to navigate the oceans in order to improve
national security.283
However, along with the freedom of navigation throughout the seas,
the United States must allow other nation-states to navigate freely close
to U.S. waters. According to the Convention, a State may exercise strict
277. See David B. Sandalow, Op-Ed., Ocean Treaty Good for US., WASH. TIMES,
May 16, 2004, available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/sandalow
20040516.htm.
278. Id.
279. See Goodlander, supra note 254.
280. See Lugar, supra note 271.
281. See Bates, supra note 263.
282. See id.
283. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: International Oceans, Environment, Health, and Aviation Law:
Administration Urges Senate Action on Law of the Sea Convention, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
498 (2005).
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jurisdiction in its Territorial Sea, but must allow more freedom of
navigation in its Contiguous Zone.284 These zones extend twelve and
twenty-four nautical miles, respectively, from the state's baseline. 285 The
limits on these zones may not be large enough to protect the U.S.
national security interests. Improving technology may make these limits
obsolete. Twelve nautical miles is not substantial considering the
technology and the capacity of ships to launch missiles from much
further away. The limits on the maritime zones imposed by the
Convention will impede national security measures by allowing certain
ships freedom of navigation closer to U.S. soil when the United States
must wait to act.
More national security concerns arise if ratifying the Convention
obstructs the U.S. Navy in its effort to stop terrorism. 286 The maritime
zones created by the Convention limit where a ship can sail and what
activities it can engage in.287 Placing restrictions on all ships, including
the Navy, will hamper the United State's ability to respond to and
prevent terrorist activity.
E. Advancement of U.S. Security Interests
By ratifying the Convention, the United States would be able to
participate in the Convention's decision-making processes. The United
States would be given a permanent seat on the Convention's council.
288
In addition, the United States could propose additional members to sit on
the Tribunal. 289 This way, the United States can take positive steps in the
direction of having its interests advanced. With a permanent seat on the
council for the Convention, the United States can ensure input in the
decision making process and attempt to ensure new policies and laws
coincide with U.S. interests.29°
Also, in support of national security interests, the provision of the
original Convention that ordered the mandatory transfer of technology
has been removed.291 In the version of the Convention that would be
284. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 25.
285. See id. arts. 3, 33.
286. See Goldsmith & Rabkin, supra note 253.
287. See, e.g., The Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
288. See The U.N. Convention On the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John D. Negroponte, Deputy
Sec'y of State), available at www.jag.navy.mil/documents/testNegroponte
Testimony07O927.pdf [hereinafter Negroponte].
289. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Senate Testimony Regarding U.S. Adherence to Law of the Sea
Convention, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (2004).
290. See Bates, supra note 263.
291. See id. at 746.
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signed by the United States, the provisions regarding the transfer of
technology are only general guidelines and there are no mandatory
provisions.292
F. Constraint on National Security Interests
By ratifying the Convention, the United States may think twice
about intercepting a ship or vessel suspected of terrorist or other criminal
activity. The Convention provides compensation for any losses or
damages to a ship that has been boarded and searched when nothing
suspicious is found.293 This part of the Convention implements sanctions
against nation-states who conduct searches that prove to be unfounded.9
In this age of uncertainty, with varying information coming from
different sources, the United States must be relatively certain of a
suspected vessel or face sanctions. Ensuring that countries wait until
there is a solid foundation for searches creates a strain on national
security. This delay in action could be costly to the United States in
preventing terrorism in a timely fashion.
V. CONCLUSION
Many arguments have been made for and against the ratification of
the Convention by the United States. However, one point of agreement
is that if the United States ratifies the Convention, it will have a profound
effect on national security. The Convention will put decisions regarding
United States operations throughout the sea in the hands of foreign
judges, but it will also reinforce current U.S. security programs. The
arguments for and against the ratification of the Convention will only be
validated if the United States actually ratifies it-a task that may be far
off. The magnitude and gravity of ratifying the Convention has led the
United States into a stalemate. However, a decision must be made in
order for the United States to go forward. If the United States chooses to
ratify the Convention, it will be a positive step in showing the
international community that the United States is willing to cooperate
and work with others toward a common goal. If however, the
Convention is not ratified, the United States will show the rest of the
world that it is set in continuing its unilateral traditions.
292. See Negroponte, supra note 288.
293. See The Convention, supra note 5, art. 110, 3.
294. See Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of
the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 341, 381 (2002).
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